Page:Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters.pdf/16

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, with whom joins, concurring in the judgment.

I agree that petitioner’s state-court claims are not pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The majority reaches this conclusion, however, by applying the Court’s precedent in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), which held that state courts are disabled from adjudicating state-law claims that concern conduct “arguably” protected under the NLRA. Id., at 245–246. Because this Court has previously held that the type of conduct alleged here is not protected, I join ’s. I write separately to emphasize the oddity of Garmon’s broad pre-emption regime.

This Court typically applies a high bar before concluding that federal law “strip[s] state courts of jurisdiction to hear their own state claims.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12). Likewise, the Court generally requires a “clear” purpose to displace state law before finding that a federal statute does so. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the majority notes, however, Garmon “goes beyond the usual preemption rule.” In Garmon, the Court