Page:Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho.pdf/27

10 As for prejudice, Garza cannot benefit from a presumed-prejudice finding since he cannot establish that his counsel caused the forfeiture of his appeal, as Flores-Ortega requires. Garza knowingly and voluntarily bargained away his right to appeal in exchange for a lower sentence. If any prejudice resulted from that decision, it cannot be attributed to his counsel.

It does not matter that certain appellate issues–specifically, (1) the voluntariness of the plea agreement and (2) a breach of the agreement by the State–are not waivable. Garza did not ask his counsel to appeal those issues. In fact, Garza has not identified any nonwaived issue that he would have brought on direct appeal; he simply identified “sentencing review” as his primary objective. Moreover, declining to file an appeal raising these nonwaivable claims is unlikely to be prejudicial; this Court has repeatedly stated that collateral review is a better avenue to address involuntariness and ineffective-assistance claims, as these claims often require extra-record materials and present conflicts with counsel. See generally Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500 (2003).

The Court’s decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S. ___ (2018), does not change the analysis. McCoy acknowledges that some decisions are “reserved for the client,” including the decision whether to “forgo an appeal.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). But Garza exercised his right to decide whether to appeal. He chose not to when he entered the plea agreements. Like many constitutional and statutory rights, the right to appeal can be waived by the defendant, and once that choice is finally made, the defendant is bound by the decision and cannot fault his attorney for the self-inflicted prejudicial effects that he suffers. For instance, a defendant cannot waive his right against self-incrimination by testifying at his trial, and then claim that his attorney prejudiced him by not moving to strike