Page:Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho.pdf/21

4 collateral counsel, admitted that the appeal waiver “was by the book,” that he “received exactly what he bargained for in exchange for his plea,” and that there was “no ambiguity” as to the appropriate sentence. Id., at 161–162, 276–277. Garza also conceded that, if forced to identify an issue he would raise on appeal, “[t]he only issue that could be identified is sentencing review.” Id., at 176, 371.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Idaho. It explained that Garza needed to identify “non-frivolous grounds for contending on appeal either that (i) the appeal waiver is invalid or unenforceable, or (ii) the issues he wants to pursue on appeal are outside the waiver’s scope.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. The Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to presume negligent performance because state law imposes a duty on counsel not to file frivolous litigation and to avoid taking actions that will jeopardize the benefit his client gained from the plea bargain. The Idaho Supreme Court also found Flores-Ortega inapplicable, reasoning that once a defendant waives his appellate rights, he no longer has a right to an appellate proceeding at all.

As with most ineffective-assistance claims, a defendant seeking to show that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file an appeal must show deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). Relying on Flores-Ortega, the majority finds that Garza has satisfied both prongs. In so holding, it adopts a rule whereby a criminal defendant’s invocation of the words “I want to appeal” can undo all sworn attestations to the contrary and resurrect waived statutory rights.

This rule is neither compelled by precedent nor consistent with the use of appeal waivers in plea bargaining.