Page:Gansky v. Hi-Tech Engineering.pdf/6

168 The Administrative Law Judge's decision was appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission. In an opinion filed October 17, 1994, the Commission by a vote of two to one, reversed the Administrative Law Judge and determined that Gansky had failed to prove that further medical treatment was reasonable and necessary and that as a result, he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Focusing on the report by the physical therapist, Cleveland Smith, the Commission concluded that Gansky's healing period for the temporary aggravation to his lower back had ended by at least February 22, 1993. The Commission stated:

Furthermore, we also find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the October 31, 1992, injury only temporally aggravated the claimant's preexisting back condition. The physical therapy reports establish that the claimant was essentially symptom free by January 11, 1993. Although he did experience another recurrence of symptoms, the physical therapy reports establish that he was again essentially symptom free by at least February 25, 1993. Also, Dr. Gocio has opined that the claimant's injury was not permanent in nature. While the claimant may continue to need periodic medical treatment due to episodes of back pain related to the degenerative condition, the need for that treatment is not causally related to the compensable injury. Therefore, we find that the claimant failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence that additional medical care is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury, and we find that the administrative law judge's decision in this regard must be reversed.

[1, 2]The issue now before us is whether the Commission erroneously denied Gansky benefits in the wake of the decision by the Administrative Law Judge to continue medical treatment. This court reviews a workers' compensation case as though it had originally been filed here. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(f); Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996); Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994). The issue then is whether medical treatment after February 22, 1993, was reasonable and necessary. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (1987). What constitutes reasonable and necessary treatment under this section is a question of fact for the Commission. Arkansas Dep't of Correction v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994); see also Morgan