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 fritter it away. But we pass from this argument ad absurdum to one ad concretum. Simplicius is said to be Urban VIII. But not appropriately, for he was no such headstrong Peripatetic as is represented by Simplicius; had he been so, it was impossible that in 1624 he should have enjoyed having "II Saggiatore" read to him at table, that cutting satire on the Aristotelian wisdom in general, and the wisdom of Father Grassi in particular; and that in the next year he should have been so much pleased with Galileo's reply to Ingoli.

Galileo's enemies founded their assertion on the circumstance that at the end of the work Simplicius employs an argument which the Pope himself had brought forward in repeated conversations in 1624 with Galileo, and on the weight of which he plumed himself not a little. It consisted of the reflection, undoubtedly more devout than scientific, that God is all-powerful, so that all things are possible to Him, and that therefore the tides could not be adduced as a necessary proof of the double motion of the earth without limiting His omnipotence. This pious objection is received by both Salviati and Sagredo with the utmost reverence. The former calls it heavenly and truly admirable, and the latter thinks that it forms a fitting conclusion to the discussion, which opinion is acted upon. The Pope's argument is thus by no means made to appear ridiculous, but quite the contrary. As to the main point, Simplicius says expressly that "he had this argument from a very eminent and learned personage." If this means Urban VIII., it is plain that Simplicius cannot be Urban VIII. Q.E.D.

In writing his "Dialogues," Galileo found himself in a difficult position. As he brought forward all the arguments