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1062 Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Idaho for yielding to me.

Mr. POPE. Mr. President, with respect to corn and wheat the conditions might be different. The farmer might not have on the farm the facilities for storing his wheat that he would have to store his corn. However, about all that can be said with reference to that is that the corn or wheat is the sole security for the charges. There is no personal obligation against the grower. If the corn or wheat when released from the granary does not sell for enough to cover the amount of the loan against it, plus any storage, then the Government will have to stand the loss, and not the producer.

I may say in conclusion on this amendment, that as to any ever-normal-granary plan objections may be raised such as have been made by the Senator from Oregon. However, I do not see anything in this provision, in the light of our experience in respect to other loans made by the Government that would make it unworkable or impractical.

Yesterday the Senator from Oregon referred to the Secretary of Agriculture, and particularly to the letter which the Secretary wrote to the authors of the bill. I may say that the Secretary of Agriculture is in full accord with this provision. It does tend to bring about the storage in an ever-normal granary for the benefit both of the farmer and of the consumer, and there is nothing in this amendment which is contrary to the generous attitude of the Secretary, which was approved by the Senator from Oregon in his discussion of the Secretary's letter. Therefore, I think it is a fair provision; with practical questions, of course, to be answered in the administration of the act. It certainly is not impractical, at least in the opinion of the Secretary, who will administer the act.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, yesterday during the debate with reference to an amendment appearing on page 14 of the bill, subsection (c), the question was asked by the able Senator from Idaho [Mr. ] where we can find the constitutional authority for this bill. I proceeded to show, as well as I could, the similarity between the provisions of the pending bill and of the Soil Conservation Act, but because of lack of time the Senator from Idaho was unwilling to further discuss the Soil Conservation Act in connection with this bill.

With particular reference to the question of the able Senator from Idaho as to constitutional authority for this bill, I will first cite the Soil Conservation Act. That is the law of the land insofar as we are presently concerned. It is my information that the constitutionality of said act has never been determined, and judging from the attitude of the able Senator from Idaho [Mr. ] it would seem that he thinks the Soil Conservation Act constitutional. As I pointed out during the debate on yesterday, at page 1332 of the, there is very little difference in the operation of the pending bill and the Soil Conservation Act. The able junior Senator from Idaho [Mr. ] presented a very comprehensive brief on the question when he spoke in favor of the pending bill sometime ago.

Mr. President, it is my view that the decision in National Labor Relations Board against Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation gives ample authority for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of this bill. In that case the Board charged unfair labor practices by the defendant corporation in that the corporation was discriminating against members of a labor union in discharging certain employees. The corporation contended that the act in dispute was in reality a regulation of labor relations and not of interstate commerce; that it had no application to the corporation's relations with its production employees because they were not subject to regulation by the Federal Government; and, finally, that the provisions of the act violated section 2 of article III of the fifth and seventh amendments of the Constitution. The corporation was engaged in the manufacture of iron and steel. It had factories in various sections of the country. It manufactured its products in such localities as it had plants. The question involved was whether or not a particular product, after being manufactured in a particular plant in a particular locality, could be prevented from being shipped through the channels of interstate commerce. The unfair labor practice complained of took place in a certain factory, while certain products were being manufactured, and the Court held in effect that as to those products that were manufactured under the alleged unfair labor practices, they could not be transported in interstate commerce.

In the pending bill there is no effort made to prevent the flow of wheat or corn in interstate commerce until after it is actually produced and after it is determined that the surpluses are such that they will affect interstate commerce; that they are detrimental to the general welfare of the Nation; that they destroy the income of farmers and their purchasing power for industrial products and the value of the agricultural assets supporting the national credit structure. There is no attempt to prevent production. Farmers may produce what they desire even after the national marketing quota is voted upon by themselves.

And I repeat that it is only excessive surpluses, determined to exist and to be on hand, that will be prevented from clogging interstate commerce. It is my belief that the Supreme Court will hold that agriculture is a national and not a local problem, and that the welfare of the Nation depends upon the welfare of the farmer.

In connection with my remarks, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed an excerpt from the case just cited, National Labor Relations Board against Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.

There being no objection, the matter referred to was ordered to be printed in the, as follows:

In the case cited the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes said:

"Giving full weight to respondent's contention with respect to a break in the complete continuity of the 'stream of commerce' by reason of respondent's manufacturing operations, the fact remains that the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would have a mast serious effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war? We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience.

"Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances. The opinion in the case of Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, points out that, in the case of carriers, experience has shown that before the amendment of 1934 of the Railway Labor Act, 'when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to represent the employees, and when there was willingness at the employer to meet such representatives for a discussion of their grievances, amicable adjustment, of differences had generally followed and strikes had been avoided.' That, on the other hand, 'a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance by the railroads of company unions and the denial by railway management of the authority of representatives chosen by their employees.' The opinion in that case also points to the large measure of success of the labor policy embodied in the Railway Labor Act. But with respect to the appropriateness of the recognition of self-organization and representation in the promotion of peace, the question is not essentially different in the case of employees in industries of such a character that interstate commerce is put in jeopardy from the case of employees of transportation companies. And of what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be transported?