Page:Frontinus - The stratagems, and, the aqueducts of Rome (Bennet et al 1925).djvu/153

 STRATAGEMS, II. ii. 14-111. 2

more difficult for the King if he should besiege each city separately. By this policy, in the first place he caused the host of the barbarians to be kept on the alert doing guard-duty all night; in the second place, he made it possible for his own followers, the next morning, with strength unimpaired, to encounter the barbarians all exhausted with watch- ing, and (precisely as he had wished) in a confined place, where Xerxes could not utilize his superiority in numbers.^

III. On the Disposition of Troops for Battlk

Gnaeus Scipio, when campaigning in Spain against Hanno, near the town of Indibile, noted that the Carthaginian line of battle was drawn up with the Spaniards posted on the right wing — sturdy soldiers, to be sure, but fighting for others — Avhile on the left were the less powerful, but more resolute, Africans. He accordingly drew back his own left wing, and keeping his battle-line at an angle with the enemy, engaged the enemy with his right wing, which he had formed of his sturdiest soldiers. Then routing the Africans and putting them to flight, he easily forced the surrender of the Spaniards, who had stood apart after the manner of spectators.'-

When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hylliais,^ he noticed that the front of the enemy consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. Accordingly he placed the stoutest of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy's left, and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a complete victory.*

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