Page:Francis V. Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission.pdf/24

6 recognition that “each subparagraph of §17(a) ‘proscribes a distinct category of misconduct’” and “‘is meant to cover additional kinds of illegalities.’” Aaron, supra, at 697 (quoting Naftalin, supra, at 774; emphasis added).

The majority disregards these express limitations. Under the Court’s rule, a person who has not “made” a fraudulent misstatement within the meaning of Rule 10b–5(b) nevertheless could be held primarily liable for facilitating that same statement; the SEC or plaintiff need only relabel the person’s involvement as an “act,” “device,” “scheme,” or “artifice” that violates Rule 10b–5(a) or (c). And a person could be held liable for a fraudulent misstatement under §17(a)(1) even if the person did not obtain money or property by means of the statement. In short, Rule 10b–5(b) and §17(a)(2) are rendered entirely superfluous in fraud cases under the majority’s reading.

This approach is in tension with “‘the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute.’” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. 639, 645 (2012) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208 (1932)). I would therefore apply the “old and familiar rule ” that “the specific governs the general.” RadLAX, supra, at 645–646 (internal quotation marks omitted); see A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 51 (2012) (canon equally applicable to statutes and regulations). This canon of construction applies not only to resolve “contradiction[s]” between general and specific provisions, but also to avoid “the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the general one.” RadLAX, 566 U. S., at 645. Here, liability for false