Page:Fox News Network v. TVEyes.pdf/15

 Google’s snippet function was designed to ensure that users could see only a very small piece of a book’s contents. Each snippet was three lines of text, constituting approximately one‐eighth of a page; a viewer could see at most three snippets per book for any searched term, and no more than one per page. Users were prevented from performing repeated searches to find multiple snippets that could be compiled into a coherent block of text. Approximately 22% of a book’s text was “blacklist[ed]”: no snippet could be shown from those pages. at 222. And snippets were not available at all for such books as dictionaries or cookbooks, in which a snippet might convey all the information that a searcher was likely to need. While the snippets allowed a user to judge whether a book was responsive to the user’s needs, they were abbreviated to ensure that it would be nearly impossible for a user to see a meaningful exposition of what the author originally intended to convey to readers.

TVEyes redistributes Fox’s news programming in ten‐minute clips, which‐‐given the brevity of the average news segment on a particular topic‐‐likely provide TVEyes’s users with all of the Fox programming that they seek and the entirety of the message conveyed by Fox to authorized viewers of the original. , 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985) (finding no fair use when the copying involved only about 300 words, but the portion copied was “the heart of the book”). TVEyes’s use of Fox’s content is therefore both “extensive” and inclusive of all that is “important” from the copyrighted work. , 804 F.3d at 221.

The fourth statutory factor is “the effect of the [secondary] use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). This factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). It “focuses on whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing substitute for the original, or its derivative, so as to deprive the rights holder of significant revenues because of the likelihood that potential purchasers may opt to acquire the copy in preference to the original.”, 804 F.3d at 223. Critically, it requires consideration of “not only the … market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer,” but also the market harm that would result from