Page:Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-street.com, LLC, et al..pdf/11

8 how the statute uses the word “registration” in a particular prescription, one must “look to the specific context” in which the term is used. Brief for Petitioner 29. As explained supra, at 4–7, the “specific context” of §411(a) permits only one sensible reading: The phrase “registration… has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act granting registration, not to the copyright claimant’s request for registration.

Fourth Estate’s contrary reading of §411(a) stems in part from its misapprehension of the significance of certain 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act. Before that year, §411(a)’s precursor provided that “[n]o action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.” 17 U. S. C. §13 (1970 ed.). Fourth Estate urges that this provision posed the very question we resolve today—namely, whether a claimant’s application alone effects registration. The Second Circuit addressed that question, Fourth Estate observes, in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F. 2d 637 (1958). Brief for Petitioner 32–34. In that case, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court held that a copyright owner who completed an application could not sue for infringement immediately upon the Copyright Office’s refusal to register. Vacheron, 260 F. 3d2d [sic], at 640–641. Instead, the owner first had to obtain a registration certificate by bringing a mandamus action against the Register. The Second Circuit dissenter would have treated the owner’s application as sufficient to permit commencement of an action for infringement. Id., at 645.

Fourth Estate sees Congress’ 1976 revision of the registration requirement as an endorsement of the Vacheron dissenter’s position. Brief for Petitioner 34–36. We disagree. The changes made in 1976 instead indicate