Page:Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs (SCA).djvu/91

Rh engage in exclusive sexual relations, with children the probable result and paternity presumed.’ The learned judge went on to say that ‘a family defined by heterosexual marriage continues to be the most prevalent social structure into which the vast majority of children are born, nurtured and prepared for productive participation in civil society’ and continued: ‘It is difficult to imagine a State purpose more important and legitimate than ensuring, promoting and supporting an optimal social structure within which to bear and raise children. At the very least, the marriage statute continues to serve this important state purpose.’ He then considered whether the Massachusetts statute, construed (as he held it had to be) as limiting marriages to couples of the opposite sex, remains a rational way to further that purpose. He concluded that it did. In reaching that conclusion he said, amongst other things: ‘As long as marriage is limited to opposite sex couples who can at least theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a consistent message to its citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their procreative endeavour; that if they are to procreate, their society has endorsed the institution of marriage as the environment for it and for the subsequent rearing of their children; and that benefits are available explicitly to create a supportive and conducive atmosphere for those purposes.