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Rh whether the term "universal concept" is intended to indicate one or more characteristics common to all objects. Croce does not explicitly state that this is his meaning; but this appears nevertheless to be the only interpretation that could justify the distinction.

But are there really characteristics common to all objects? There would seem to be two, and only two: first, the fact that these objects are known by us; second, the fact that these objects differ from each other. But these two characteristics may evidently be reduced to one single characteristic, namely, the fact of "being." For we predicate being of those things which we know, directly or indirectly; and we know things only in so far as they differ from each other, since complete and homogeneous unity would be tantamount to unknowability—that is, so far as we are concerned, to non-existence, or "not-being."

The diversity of objects and their resultant knowability mean then only this: that the objects exist. "Being" would then seem to be the only "universal concept" in the supposedly Crocean sense. And its very uniqueness deprives it of real value: for a concept has meaning only in so far as it may be distinguished from other concepts, whereas in this case we cannot conceive of anything which, through the very fact of being conceived, is non-existent. "Not-being" is unthinkable, and cannot serve therefore to help