Page:Ford, Kissinger - August 28, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552768).pdf/4

Rh It is difficult for me to imagine any political advantage from any minor difference in numbers.

For political purposes, we are equal now.

They make up by throw weight.

Throw weight is useful only if it can be translated into numbers of warheads and accuracy. But they haven't yet put on large numbers of warheads -- the most is  So large numbers will have to be on the next generation, not the one they are developing now.

Their accuracies are not now up to ours. Whenever you want more throw weight, we can do it any time, within the agreement, in the Minuteman silos. We could probably put warheads per missile, if there is any use to it.

We cannot look as if we were behind, and it would look better if we were ahead, but it has little political significance.

Increasing the B-52 alert is a signal -- there is no way to see an alert with Minuteman. We don't see any increased alert for their missiles.

It is not that we can neglect our strategic forces, but that with the present programs, there is no way we can fall behind. If we have more funds, I think it is better to put them in our tactical forces.

What does the include?

All but tactical forces. But Brown counts all of them. Brezhnev told us we had nuclear weapons. If you count in the worst case you get up around there.

On superiority you can get any briefing you want. If you count bombers, we are about even on throw weight, but bomber throw weight is different. Take the worst case on throw weight -- give them high accuracy. Even if they got the Minuteman, we would have still about warheads. To do this they would have to launch at least warheads, or  missiles, simultaneously, in a north-south direction, and assume you wouldn't launch Minuteman on warning. Even then we would have our bombers, submarines, and FBS.