Page:Ford, Kissinger, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin - September 12, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552784).pdf/4

Rh We both know the Soviet Union would like to be disruptive.

Whenever the process slips, that is what the Soviet Union will try. It can't be avoided; the question is when is the best time.

If that is true, we would rather face it now.

No, it depends on the Arab constellation.

We would like non-belligerency from Egypt as the move from war to peace.

What does that mean specifically?

We have given Dr. Kissinger a partial list.

Without the basic change from war to peace, the process will be salami tactics.

I have a couple of comments I want to make:

First, the United States wants Israel strong enough for its security. That is my firm position. When we look over the numbers and dollars, I think we can come to agreement on what is needed for Israel's national security. One of our problems is some people don't see a need for a strong United States military posture. We are very grateful to Ambassador Dinitz for helping in this regard.

Let me make a comment on the long-range, with respect to Congress: To get Congress to move on a ten-year program today is not attainable. I can't make a ten-year commitment for everything you need because Congress won't make that kind of commitment. They might make a lesser commitment in time. There are responsible leaders who have every view to work with us.

It is of the utmost importance to proceed along the lines you suggest. Going right to Geneva would solidify Arab unity.

I like the sequence of Egypt and Jordan -- that seems to be the best procedure. As we move there, we should move on a unilateral basis, and we know you can't do things on a 6-12 month basis. We want to help and think we can work things out.