Page:Ford, Kissinger, Ambassador Graham Martin (South Vietnam) - September 13, 1974(Gerald Ford Library)(1552785).pdf/4

 WASHINGTON POST 11 August 1974 (12)

ONGRESS, in its deliberations on aid for South Vietnam is shying away from the central issue: What is the American interest? For if it matters to the United States whether Saigon fares well or ill, one aid strategy is dictated; and if not, another. To proceed as though the level and kind of aid has no real connection to the goal of American policy is to fly blind.

Like many Americans, we had hoped that the Paris Agreement of 1973 would launch the contending Vietnamese all the path to eventual reconciliation. This would have resolved the America dilemma. But it has not happened. Hanoi and Saigon are still fighting; it looks as though they will for a long time. If one side or the other were clearly at fault, that would be one thing. We accept, however, the judgment of a new Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study: "Lack of respect for the Agreement is so widespread that it is impossible to apportion responsibility for the continued fighting."

This bears directly on congressional efforts to cut aid. It would be grievously unfair in our view for the United States—by withholding aid—to penalize Saigon alone for a breakdown which is properly the responsibility of both Vietnamese sides. Nor does withholding aid become any fairer in these circumstances when it is described as a way to induce President Thieu to honor the. Paris Agreement and to make concessions to his Vietnamese rivals. We have leaned toward this view ourselves in the past. But looking at the record of the last 20 months, we have had second thoughts. We now conclude that it is wrong to try to make Saigon alone observe the agreement, to its political detriment, when Hanoi is under no similar pressure observe its aide of the agreement. Unilateral pressure, furthermore, precludes a new American approach to Moscow and Peking—an approach we believe should be made—to reduce further all outsiders' roles, especially as arms suppliers.

ThJ!" only cOrrect basis for phasing out atd, we noVl believe, is a determination that it no tonger',s important to the United States what happens lu- South Vietnam. A powerful cue for 'l1lb can be made: the United States has invested an immense amount of blood, tre3sure and prestige in Vietnam, won that countryj)e opportunity to fend for itself. and nOW' has its own� good reason to. turn aside. But if this determination Is to be made, we Ame~icans owe to ourselves-and to the Vietnamese and to others elsewhere wh? rely upon u&-to nuke it openly. To pledge fidelity ,butto reduce our suppo~ progressively even precipItately b to undermine ibotb. Interest and honor. If the Congress In its fatigue or 'Wisdom-whatever the mix-is to pare aId this year and to threaten to eut even more next year, it should have the courage to announce that it no iongerconslders the outcome in Vietnam as a matter of American consequence. To cut aid while claiming that the cut will actually improve Saigon's chances of securing its own salvation is double. talk. To cut aid whUe declaring that the people of South, Vietnam will benefit from the neW policies thereby i " forud upon, President Thieu is at best, spec:ulationi in � our view, it is too,flimsy a foundation for policy.

The ,alternative approach Is. of course. to aeknowledge a continuing Interest m the fate of Saigon and to act accordingly on aid. This Is the course we have come to r ' favor, after having inclined the oth!1" way during the I past 20 months. What has persuaded us to ehaDge our t view .Is largely the prime new fact that a mutually acceptable poUtlcal solution has seemed progressively to recede from reach. We, think that Americans wOuld not like to live lD It world where'a sman nationihat had .trong :reawil tu rely .on American staadf~-tnes.; h:.d: been let down. Iil that sense, the Americau �'<commitment" to Saigon is open-ended. To hold, otherwise is to advertJse one's own unreliability. It can be argued. with .all toO much merit, that the assurance American sup-. port lets Saigon Ignore American efforts to induce changes in its domestic policies and In Its attitude towards Banol The answel'-SUreIy worth testing-ls that Saigon. may become more responsive to American advice as it becomes less fearful of American abandon.Die.nt.

Aid to Vietnam. should be offered On. t.'ha basfs of. what doUar levels and wbat forms of aid (economic 0: military) and what particular programs 'Will enable Saigon to t,"d effecti.ely to its citizeu security and welfare. Thbs formulation admittedly leaves many loose ends. many unresolved arguments, many uncertainties. There is in the United States an evident shortage of economic and polr-Jca1 resources to assure. lucces.s. And whether the Thieu government can adequately respond . Is a question bound to trouble any realistic: observer. We are convinced, nonetheless, that the' principle of American steadfastness deserves to be honOred as best we ('all, even though the 'part1cula.r government benefittmg from its application in this Instance is far from a model regime. There is where the overriding American 'interest Uer.