Page:Fm100-2-3 - The Soviet Army, Troops, Organization, and Equipment.pdf/10

FM 100-2-3 divisions and regiments, respectively, materiel support battalions and companies combine formerly fragmented motor transport, supply, and service functions. The new rear area units will provide a 30-percent increase in motor transport assets and a streamlined command structure. A similar reorganization at army and front levels has created materiel support brigades with centralized control for ammunition, fuel, and other supplies.

The airbome division is now a fully mechanized combined arms organization. Airborne divisions now consist of three regiments equipped with the air-droppable BMD, affording these units greater firepower and mobility. The Soviets have also produced a new 120-millimeter 289 airborne selfpropelled (SP) howitzer with a mortar capability for airborne and air assault units.

Concurrent with these organizational changes, the Soviets have pursued a comprehensive equipment modernization program that affects many divisional subunits. The main thrusts of the equipment upgrade are in the following areas:


 * Medium tanks.
 * Armored IFVs.
 * Armored command and reconnaissance vehicles.
 * Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).
 * Surfaceto-surfaceSurface-to-surface [sic] missiles (SSMs).
 * Surfaceto-airSurface-to-air [sic] missiles (SAMs).

Since the late 1970s,the Soviets have developed the tank regiment (TR) into a combined arms team (tank, motorized rifle, and artillery) that promises to be as flexible in its employment as the motorized rifle regiment (MRR). (The MRR already had a tank battalion (TB) and an artillery battalion.) The addition of an MRB to the TR of a TD eliminates the necessity for the TD commander to reinforce each of his TRs with MRR assets. This leaves the TD with four maneuver regiments. The addition of an artillery battalion to the TR places a great deal more firepower under direct control of the regimental commander. The division commander then has greater flexibility in the use of his artillery resources to influence the battle.

Hence, the capability of the TR and TD to conduct largely self-supported combined arms combat has increased greatly.

Large-caliber SP guns and mortars and longtange MRLs have increased the artillery available to army and front commanders. Additionally, some army-level regiments have grown to brigade size with the addition of a fourth artillery battalion. These battalions are currently expanding from 18 to 24 tubes, primarily in units opposite NATO. All of the Soviet's SP and towed guns/howitzers (152-millimeter and larger) are nuclear-capable. The Soviets are also adding newer nuclear-capable pieces such as the 203-millimeter SP gun 2S7and the 240-millimeter SP mortar 284. They are deploying the BM-22 220-millimeter MRL, which can fire deep into the enemy's rear. These improve ments greatly enhance area coverage and counterbattery support to subordinate divisions. The new T-64/72/80-seriestanks feature improved firepower, with a 125-millimeter main gun and an improved fire control system. Both the T-80 and a variant of the T-64 can fire an ATGM through the main tube. The T-80 can mount reactive armor which further protects against the West's antitank capabilities. At the same time, the establishment of army aviation has given ground forces a vertical dimension. The helicopter now provides CAAsand TAs with a highly maneuverable and versatile platform for reconnaissance, command and control (C2),and fire support. General-purpose and attack helicopter units can move with armies and divisions at the high rates of advance they will need to conduct combined arms operations in depth.

While changes in the organization and equipment of the ground forces are significant in themselves and have serious implications for Western defense planning, they do not take place in isolation. Instead, these shifts appear to be part of a larger change in the concept for employment and organization of the armed forces. This change should greatly enhance the flexibility with which Soviet military planners can apply force to achieve military objectives. (For more information on Soviet operations and tactics, see FM 100-2-1.)