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 his assassination, Mr. Hariri’s protection was ensured almost entirely by his private security team.

21. When the Mission discussed this aspect with Lebanese security officials, many of them argued that "prevention" was an alien concept to the security management in Lebanon. This argument is inadmissible: prevention is an integral and important part of any functioning security system. In addition, the argument is also untrue: the Republican Guard informed us that they maintained periodic "assessment profiles" regarding the security of the President, including evaluating the level of threat and risk he was subject to based on their reading of the political situation, rumours and the overall security situation. A functioning, credible and professional security apparatus should have prepared, maintained and updated a similar assessment profile in regard to the security of "the most important political figure in Lebanon".

22. Based on the above, it is the view of the Mission that the Lebanese security apparatus failed to provide proper protection for Mr. Hariri and therefore provided a convenient context for his assassination.

B. Circumstances
23. In gathering the facts related to the circumstances, the Mission identified the last movements of Mr. Hariri immediately before the assassination took place, determined the origin of the explosion and the type and weight of explosive used, and reviewed the main avenues of the investigation undertaken by the Lebanese authorities based on accepted international standards. The review of the investigation included the critical areas of: the management of the crime scene; the preservation of evidence; the investigation of the claim of responsibility for the attack broadcast on the television network Al-Jazeera; the investigation of the suspect bomber; the investigation of the suspect vehicle; and general remarks on the investigation’s integrity.

The last movements of Mr. Hariri
24. On Monday, 14 February 2005, at approximately 1230 hours, Mr. Hariri left the Parliament building in central Beirut and walked approximately 70 metres to a cafe (Place de l’Étoile) in Nejmeh Square, where he met with a number of people. At approximately 1250 hours he left the cafe accompanied by former Minister and member of Parliament Bassil Fuleihan. His security convoy consisted of six vehicles; first, a jeep with four local policemen (the lead vehicle); second, a black Mercedes with three private security guards; third, a black armour-plated Mercedes driven by Mr. Hariri accompanied by Mr. Fuleihan; fourth, a black Mercedes with three private security guards; fifth, a black Mercedes with three private security guards; and sixth, a black Jeep (an ambulance) bringing up the rear with three private security guards. Three of the Mercedes were equipped with high-powered signal jamming devices (four gigahertz), which were operating at the time of the final journey. All of the vehicles were equipped with firearms and all of the security detail were trained.

25. The chosen route was communicated to the lead car only as Mr. Hariri was leaving the cafe. The convoy left Nejmeh Square and drove along Ahdab Street and on to Fosh Street. At the junction of Fosh Street and Seaport Street, the convoy turned left and took the coast road towards Ain M’reisa and the Hotel St Georges.