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 10. According to these testimonies, Mr. Hariri reminded Mr. Assad of his pledge not to seek an extension for Mr. Lahoud’s term, and Mr. Assad replied that there had been a policy shift and that the decision was already taken. He added that Mr. Lahoud should be viewed as his personal representative in Lebanon and that "opposing him is tantamount to opposing Assad himself". He then added that he (Mr. Assad) "would rather break Lebanon over the heads of (Mr.) Hariri and (Druze leader Walid) Jumblatt than see his word in Lebanon broken". According to the testimonies, Mr. Assad then threatened both Mr. Hariri and Mr. Jumblatt with physical harm if they opposed the extension for Mr. Lahoud. The meeting reportedly lasted for 10 minutes, and was the last time Mr. Hariri met with Mr. Assad. After that meeting, Mr. Hariri told his supporters that they had no other option but to support the extension for Mr. Lahoud. The Mission has also received accounts of further threats made to Mr. Hariri by security officials in case he abstained from voting in favour of the extension or "even thought of leaving the country".

11. On 2 September 2004, the Security Council had adopted its resolution 1559 (2004), which, among other provisions, called upon "all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and declared "its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential elections conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence". It is widely believed, inside and outside Lebanon, that Mr. Hariri lent active support to this resolution. Numerous sources in Lebanon informed the Mission that the Syrian leadership had held Mr. Hariri personally responsible for the adoption of the resolution, and that this resolution marked the end of whatever trust existed between the two sides. On 3 September, the vote on the extension was brought to the Parliament. Mr. Hariri and his parliamentarian bloc voted in its favour. Three ministers voted against it, among them Marwan Hemadeh, a close associate of both Mr. Hariri and Mr. Jumblatt. The amendment was passed, and Mr. Lahoud’s term was extended for three years. On 9 September, Mr. Hariri announced his resignation.

12. Political tension reached a new height with that resignation. Additional numbers of political figures joined what later became labelled the "opposition", which mainly called for a review of Syrian-Lebanese relations. Some of the opposition leaders preferred to review these relations in line with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), while others preferred to review them under the banner of the Taif Agreement. The upcoming legislative elections were widely seen as a turning point and it became apparent to all that the parties were preparing for a final showdown. Until the extension for Mr. Lahoud, the opposition was mainly composed of Christian politicians and groups. The decision by Mr. Jumblatt’s bloc to join forces with them was a major development insofar as it expanded the opposition coalition beyond the sectarian dividing lines, especially in light of Mr. Jumblatt’s traditional alliance with the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Hariri’s resignation added more strength to the opposition by bringing in the large and influential Sunni community.

13. On 2 October, former Minister Marwan Hemadeh narrowly escaped death when a bomb exploded next to his car. His guard was killed in the explosion. The attempt on Mr. Hemadeh’s life sent shock waves throughout Lebanon and added to the ongoing polarization. The perpetrators of the assassination attempt were not identified, and a general feeling prevailed that they would not be. A loaded atmosphere dominated the Lebanese scene in which "everyone was under threat", as many security officials told the Mission. A wide range of people, inside and outside