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 government to prepare for the upcoming elections. Fears of a constitutional void were voiced to the Mission, as well as fears of the inability to vote in an electoral law in time or to prepare adequately for the May legislative elections. Many suggested that international supervision of the elections would be necessary to ensure their fairness. They pointed out that a credible election would contribute to stabilizing the political situation. There are also fears of civil strife, as the opposition and loyalty divide is worryingly loaded with intercommunal significance. These political upheavals carry threats to the peace and security of Lebanon, with obvious implications for stability in the region as a whole.

59. Moreover, Lebanese politicians from different backgrounds and allegiances expressed to the Mission their fears that Lebanon would become, once again, a battleground for external forces. Many pointed to the long and tragic civil war as an example of external powers struggling for power through Lebanese actors. They underlined the fragility of the Lebanese polity and its limited ability to sustain pressure. Many political figures emphasized their worry that Lebanon would be caught in a possible showdown between the Syrian Arab Republic and the international community, with possibly devastating consequences for Lebanese peace and security. Lebanese political leaders across the board implored the Mission to call upon the international community not to use Lebanon as a tool of pressure. As one interlocutor told the Mission: "The tool is too fragile, and would easily break."

III. Concluding remarks and recommendations
60. It is the Mission’s view that the Lebanese security services and the Syrian Military Intelligence bear the primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection, and law and order in Lebanon. The Lebanese security services have demonstrated serious and systematic negligence in carrying out the duties usually performed by a professional national security apparatus. In doing so, they have severely failed to provide the citizens of Lebanon with an acceptable level of security and have therefore contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. The Syrian Military Intelligence shares this responsibility to the extent of its involvement in running the security services in Lebanon.

61. Second, it is also the Mission’s view that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the assassination of former Prime Minister, Mr. Hariri. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic clearly exerted influence that went beyond the reasonable exercise of cooperative or neighbourly relations. It interfered with the details of governance in Lebanon in a heavy-handed and inflexible manner that was the primary reason for the political polarization that ensued. Without prejudice to the results of the investigation, it is obvious that this atmosphere provided the backdrop for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.

62. Third, it became clear to the Mission that the Lebanese investigation process suffered from serious flaws. Whether caused by lack of capabilities or commitment, this process is unlikely to reach a satisfactory conclusion. In addition, the credibility of the Lebanese authorities handling the investigation has been questioned by a great number of Lebanese, in the opposition as well as in government. It is therefore