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 tranquillity in Lebanon could not be restored without bringing this crime to an acceptable closure. Many reminded the Mission of previous political assassinations: either they had not been investigated properly or the investigations had not led to convincing results. All of our interlocutors emphasized that this assassination was one too many, that what they described as "the culture of intimidation and brutal use of force" had to come to an end, and that the Lebanese people and their political leaders deserved to live free from fear, intimidation and the risk of physical harm.

51. The families of the victims were understandably still in shock when the Mission met with them. Mr. Hariri’s family still could not believe that a man who had devoted his life to the service of his country could be simply eliminated while the truth about his murder hung on an investigation whose credibility was very much in doubt. The families of the other victims — the guards, the workers at the scene, the passers-by, and all those who lost their lives accidentally — were unable to comprehend yet what had happened or why. For all these people the talk about the capabilities of the security services, and the coordination among them, or the political speculations of the populace only increased their pain. All they yearned for now was the truth, for a way to bring this to closure and to allow them to mourn their loved ones.

52. The families of the victims as well as political leaders from different political and communal backgrounds, including officials and members of the Government, have all indicated that the formation of an international and independent investigation commission is the only way to uncover the truth about the assassination of Mr. Hariri. Some of our interlocutors accused the Lebanese and Syrian security services of involvement in the assassination — of wilfully derailing the Lebanese investigation in order to cover up for the crime. Others, from the Government side, indicated that an international investigation would be needed specifically to prove the innocence of the Lebanese security services; but such a result could not be achieved without external help, given the diminished credibility of the Lebanese security services and investigators.

53. During our stay in Lebanon, ordinary people stopped us in the streets of Beirut and thanked us for our efforts to find the truth, urged us not to leave this matter unresolved, and reminded us of the importance of bringing the culprits to justice "for the sake of Lebanon". Posters in the streets of Beirut carry one word, in two languages: the truth, al-haqiqa. Politicians, officials in the Government at all levels, and even some security officials told us that finding the truth "this time" was crucial for restoring civil peace in the country, reducing the tension and allowing Lebanon to move towards normalcy.

54. In addition, the assassination of Mr. Hariri seems to have unlocked the gates of political upheavals that were simmering throughout the last year. Accusations and counter-accusations are rife and fuel a strongly polarized political debate. Some accuse the Syrian security services and leadership of assassinating Mr. Hariri because he became an insurmountable obstacle to their influence in Lebanon. They argue that his removal became necessary in order for the Syrian Arab Republic to retain control over the Lebanese political polity, especially if the Syrian Arab Republic was forced to withdraw its forces. The adherents of this theory affirm that the Syrian leadership would not mind being the "obvious suspect" and that it has used similar tactics in the past with little or no concern about leaving traces. According to these sources, this attitude is part of the Syrian Arab Republic’s