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does not assess whether Top Ten Percent Law admittees exhibit sufficient diversity within diversity, whether the requisite 'change agents' are among them, and whether these admittees are able, collectively or individually, to combat pernicious stereotypes"). Furthermore, UT has not identified "when, if ever, its goal (which remains unde­fined) for qualitative diversity will be reached." Id., at 671. UT's intraracial diversity rationale is thus too impre­cise to permit strict scrutiny analysis.

Finally, UT's shifting positions on intraracial diversity, and the fact that intraracial diversity was not emphasized in the Proposal, suggest that it was not "the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification." Missis­sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 730 (1982). Instead, it appears to be a post hoc rationalization.

UT also alleges — and the majority embraces — an inter­est in avoiding "feelings of loneliness and isolation" among minority students. Ante, at 14–15; see Brief for Respond­ents 7–8, 38–39. In support of this argument, they cite only demographic data and anecdotal statements by UT officials that some students (we are not told how many) feel "isolated." This vague interest cannot possibly satisfy strict scrutiny.

If UT is seeking demographic parity to avoid isolation, that is impermissible racial balancing. See Part II–C–1, supra. And linking racial loneliness and isolation to state demographics is illogical. Imagine, for example, that an African-American student attends a university that is 20% African-American. If racial isolation depends on a com­parison to state demographics, then that student is more likely to feel isolated if the school is located in Mississippi (which is 37.0% African-American) than if it is located in Montana (which is 0.4% African-American). See United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, online at