Page:Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. (2016) (slip opinion).pdf/6

Rh upholding this nuanced use of race, Grutter implicitly overruled Hopwood’s categorical prohibition.

In the wake of Grutter, the University embarked upon a year-long study seeking to ascertain whether its admis­sions policy was allowing it to provide “the educational benefits of a diverse student body. . . to all of the Univer­sity’s undergraduate students.” App. 481a–482a (affidavit of N. Bruce Walker ¶11 (Walker Aff.)); see also id., at 445a–447a. The University concluded that its admissions policy was not providing these benefits. Supp. App. 24a–25a.

To change its system, the University submitted a pro­posal to the Board of Regents that requested permission to begin taking race into consideration as one of “the many ways in which [an] academically qualified individual might contribute to, and benefit from, the rich, diverse, and challenging educational environment of the Univer­sity.” Id., at 23a. After the board approved the proposal, the University adopted a new admissions policy to imple­ment it. The University has continued to use that admis­sions policy to this day.

Although the University’s new admissions policy was a direct result of Grutter, it is not identical to the policy this Court approved in that case. Instead, consistent with the State’s legislative directive, the University continues to fill a significant majority of its class through the Top Ten Percent Plan (or Plan). Today, up to 75 percent of the places in the freshman class are filled through the Plan. As a practical matter, this 75 percent cap, which has now been fixed by statute, means that, while the Plan contin­ues to be referenced as a “Top Ten Percent Plan,” a student actually needs to finish in the top seven or eight percent of his or her class in order to be admitted under this category.

The University did adopt an approach similar to the one in Grutter for the remaining 25 percent or so of the