Page:Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. (2016) (slip opinion).pdf/44

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UT seems to have resorted to a simple racial census.

The majority, for its part, claims that “[a]lthough de­mographics alone are by no means dispositive, they do have some value as a gauge of the University’s ability to enroll students who can offer underrepresented perspec­tives.” Ante, at 14. But even if UT merely “view[s] the demographic disparity as cause for concern,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, and is seeking only to reduce—rather than eliminate—the disparity, that unde­fined goal cannot be properly subjected to strict scrutiny. In that case, there is simply no way for a court to know what specific demographic interest UT is pursuing, why a race-neutral alternative could not achieve that interest, and when that demographic goal would be satisfied. If a demographic discrepancy can serve as “a gauge” that justifies the use of racial discrimination, ante, at 14, then racial discrimination can be justified on that basis until demographic parity is reached. There is no logical stop­ ping point short of patently unconstitutional racial balancing. Demographic disparities thus cannot be used to satisfy strict scrutiny here. See Croson, supra, at 498 (rejecting a municipality’s assertion that its racial set-aside program was justified in light of past discrimination because that assertion had “ ‘no logical stopping point’ ” and could continue until the percentage of government contracts awarded to minorities “mirrored the percentage of minorities in the population as a whole”); Wygant v. ''Jackson Bd. of Ed.'', 476 U. S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the government’s asserted interest because it had “no logical stopping point”).

The other major explanation UT offered in the Proposal was its desire to promote classroom diversity. The Pro­posal stressed that UT “has not reached a critical mass at the classroom level.” Supp. App. 24a (emphasis added);