Page:Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. (2016) (slip opinion).pdf/11

8 groups,” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339, it does impose “on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating” that “race-neutral alternatives” that are both “available” and “workable” “do not suffice.” Fisher I, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).

Fisher I set forth these controlling principles, while taking no position on the constitutionality of the admis­sions program at issue in this case. The Court held only that the District Court and the Court of Appeals had “confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12) The Court remanded the case, with instructions to evaluate the record under the correct standard and to determine whether the University had made “a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve” the educational benefits that flow from diversity. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). On remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the pro­gram conformed with the strict scrutiny mandated by Fisher I. See 758 F. 3d, at 659–660. Judge Garza dissented.

The University’s program is sui generis. Unlike other approaches to college admissions considered by this Court, it combines holistic review with a percentage plan. This approach gave rise to an unusual consequence in this case: The component of the University’s admissions policy that had the largest impact on petitioner’s chances of admis­sion was not the school’s consideration of race under its holistic-review process but rather the Top Ten Percent Plan. Because petitioner did not graduate in the top 10 percent of her high school class, she was categorically ineligible for more than three-fourths of the slots in the incoming freshman class. It seems quite plausible, then, to think that petitioner would have had a better chance of