Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/836

 Foreign state adversaries of the United States generally disguise their efforts to influence U.S. audiences, particularly when they seek to influence U.S. voters' views in the run-up to an election. Among the many ways of concealing the foreign-state origin or sponsorship of such a message is to use unattributable proxies—"cut-outs"—or fully independent ideological allies in the United States as messaging organs. A cooperative American messenger—a proxy for the foreign government itself—may be needed to make the foreign-origin message congenial to the target American audience.

Malign foreign influencers, including foreign governments, used an additional such masking tool during the Trump administration: amplifying U.S.-originated messages so that they reached a broader audience. These influencers often took advantage of the algorithms by which social media platforms bring congenial messages and other information to users whose views are likely to be similar or compatible.

Shortly after the January 6th attack, the National Intelligence Council summarized the scope and significance of Russia's use of proxies in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election: A key element of Moscow's strategy this election cycle was its use of proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push influence narratives—including misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden—to US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals, including some close to former President Trump and his administration. The success of the proxy depends on shielding its foreign sponsorship. For that reason, it can be difficult or impossible to determine conclusively whether someone parroting a foreign government adversary's point of view to a U.S. audience is that government's controlled proxy or a volunteer taking full advantage of U.S. First Amendment freedoms.

U.S. adversaries use anti-American propaganda and disinformation to advance their strategic foreign policy objectives. They aim to corrode U.S. influence abroad while diluting U.S. citizens' trust in their democratic institutions and processes. They hope to deepen and sharpen the sociopolitical divisions in American society. In doing so, foreign adversaries hope not only to limit U.S. ability to influence the policy choices of other foreign states, but also to help immunize their own populations against the attractions of American-style democracy.

That matters, as Russia and other adversaries of the United States well know. If the United States has long demonstrated such a globally effective cultural power to attract, its corrosion must be a primary strategic objective