Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/771

 for me to execute. . . which I found kind of disturbing," Major General Walker said. "You're coming up with a plan without me being involved in the plan?"

General McConville agreed that "usually[,] the Secretary of Army is not developing concepts for the employment, but because of the situation that wasn't done," so the secretary had to fill in the gap. That, of course—given the preparations Colonel Hunter had laid out hours earlier—was not true. But Secretary McCarthy did not know that.

He said Major General Walker never told him about how Colonel Hunter had prepared and that it was his responsibility to tell him. "I don't talk to troop lead commanders, no," he said.

Ultimately, no plan from Army leaders—strategic or tactical—made it to the troops.

"[I]f they came up with a plan, they never shared it with us," Major General Walker said. "They claim they were putting a plan together. That's what took so long. I never saw a plan from the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army."

Colonel Hunter agreed that "[n]o one ever told me, because I already had the plan there, and no one ever informed me that there was a different plan or a different [con-op]." He said to the extent a "hasty plan" was put into action on January 6th, it was his: "I created the concept of operation." He added: "The [plan] that was actually used as far as which lot they would come into, who would meet them at the lot, and then who would lead them over to the Capitol. That was between myself and MPD and Capitol Police."

After hours of wait, Major General Walker said, "The plan was executed just like we said it would be [from the start], get to the Capitol, take direction from the ranking police officers there . . . to help restore order." Colonel Hunter passed the details of his hasty plan onto Lt. Col. Reinke—the highest ranking officer at the rally point—letting him know, "Hey, when you pull into this lot, they will meet you there. This is who is—you know, you're going with these personnel," exactly what Secretary McCarthy had just spent 20 minutes putting together.

Although Lt. Col. Reinke said his QRF servicemembers were given rules of engagement before arriving at the rally point, he was not told more than report to Capitol Police and supplement and assist them.

Captain Tarp, outranked by Lt. Col. Reinke but in charge of the second shift, was merely told by Brigadier General Ryan: "'You need to act like there's a fire now. You're going to [the] Capitol.' Those were his directions."