Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/770

 By 3:45 p.m., Secretary McCarthy was done with his calls and—after picking up some things from his office—headed down to the MPD headquarters to draft a con-op beside law enforcement. Acting Secretary Miller arrived at 4:10 p.m.

While he was waiting, Colonel Hunter decided he would keep the first shift handling traffic control out at their posts in case they were needed for re-mission by the MPD, relying instead only on the QRF and the second shift at the Armory to respond to the Capitol. Those servicemembers ended up manning their traffic control posts up to 20 hours straight. Army leadership never found out that the servicemembers at the traffic control posts didn't end up responding to the Capitol that night, incorrectly crediting some of the Guard's delay that day to their travel time.

By 3:50 p.m., the QRF had arrived at the Armory, bringing their own equipment, given no new information upon making the extra pit stop there instead of the Capitol. They were ready to go, steeped in "a lot of nerves." The second shift of servicemembers originally missioned for traffic control had been told as early as 2:30 p.m. to expect a switch in mission to handling civil disturbance. They rushed to gear up and prepare, but it was a lot of "hurry up and wait." Not long afterward, "we're all ready. Now we're all donned. So go sit on the bleachers and wait . . . We were in a tight holding pattern until the time to deploy."

At around the same time, at 3:49 p.m., Speaker Pelosi is heard in video footage from that day urging Acting Secretary Miller to hurry.

"Just pretend for a moment this was the Pentagon or the White House or some other entity that was under siege," she told him over the phone while she—and the rest of the Congressional leadership—were huddled in a secure location. "Just get them there!"

When Secretary McCarthy arrived at MPD headquarters, he joined Chief Contee, his Army Operations Director Brigadier General Chris LaNeve, and Assistant Chief Carroll by phone.

In the next 20 minutes, Secretary McCarthy developed a con-op.

As Secretary McCarthy had decided after the summer, crafting a strategy was his job—"I was doing it with the Mayor, the police chief, and the deputy director of the FBI, my counterparts, and then ultimately wanted to understand what our role would be, the conditions"—and afterward, "we turned to [Major General Walker] to work the tactical details for that."

But Major General Walker said, "If I need you to tell me how to execute a civil disturbance mission," he "[s]hould relieve me. Should fire me."

It wasn't until later, post-January 6th, that Major General Walker said he found out that Secretary McCarthy, his boss, had been putting together a con-op—without him. "Then later they said they had to put together a plan