Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/760

 As to the second group of available resources—the servicemembers stationed at traffic control points since the early morning of January 6th—Army leadership held misconceptions about what equipment was available to them. Secretary McCarthy had agreed that some gear—expressly not batons—could remain stowed away in vehicle trunks. Colonel Hunter had his troops put the gear into a white box truck instead and designated a rally point for the truck that would be central to all traffic control points. On the night of January 5th, in anticipation of January 6th, Colonel Hunter had his troops move the civil disturbance gear—including the prohibited batons—into the individual vehicles themselves. Captain Tarp, the head of the second shift, agreed that they were told to load the equipment into their vehicles "on the down low. Done so it wasn't visible, so it wouldn't look like we were escalating [our] role."

The commanding general of the DC Guard was aware that the troops had all they needed in their trunks and—in the case of an emergency—would not need to return to the Armory to get it: "They already had it," Major General Walker said.

But Army leadership did not know that. Although General Piatt said "We never asked, like, what was actually—I have no knowledge of what they [actually] had in" the vehicles, the guidance from Secretary McCarthy's letter led him to believe that "weapons, ammunition, batons, shields, kneepads, other protection that we may be asked to do for civil disturbance, that was not [there]—because they were specifically told they would not participate in that mission . . . ." Secretary McCarthy said, "The only thing I authorized General Walker to do was their ballistic helmets and body armor in the vehicle, not their shields or their riot batons." He figured his orders had been followed. When asked why he was not aware of the moves the Guard had made, Secretary McCarthy said, "I mean, I made a mistake. I think a local unit commander was anticipating more than what potentially we were prepared for."

DC Guard leadership understood that loading this equipment flouted direct orders. "I wasn't going to have my soldiers unprepared," Major General Walker said. The prohibition on batons, in particular, had been sent 54 minutes after the Guard had already begun their traffic control shifts on the morning of January 5th.

The third group of available resources—the servicemembers awaiting at the Armory to take over as the second shift at the traffic control points—had equipment accessible to them at headquarters. Captain Tarp did note that it took time to ensure that the Armory equipment was in working order: repairing straps that were broken, wiping off dirt on the shields because "they were the same from the George Floyd protests," and affixing the helmet to the shields, which took upwards of 20 to 30 minutes. In the