Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/759

 |Irving said. "I always felt that I had full authority to implement security decisions as I deemed appropriate." In fact, when the three men briefed congressional leaders on January 5th, Chief Sund conveyed the same optimistic outlook as he had with Major General Walker: "[We told them] we felt we were prepared based on the information we had, yes," he said.

To keep these exchanges in perspective, we note again that we are aware of no evidence that these individuals were privy to President Trump's plans to instruct tens of thousands of his supporters to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol to help "take back" their country. Nor were they aware of how President Trump would suggest to his followers that Vice President Pence had the authority to change the outcome of the election, or how President Trump would behave in the hours that followed. Certain members of Congress, including those who met at the White House on December 21, 2020, may have had considerably more insight into President Trump's planning, but the Committee has no information suggesting that any of those members alerted the Capitol Police or other authorities of President Trump's plans.

Soldiers Prepare for the Worst in Secret. Guard reinforcements could draw from a pool of three groups already activated for the day: (1) the 40 members making up the QRF, staged in Maryland; (2) the 90 members at the traffic control points, 24 at the Metro stations, and four as part of the command staff distributed throughout the city—but no farther east than Ninth Street—for a total of 118 representing the first shift; and (3) the second shift of another 118 members, preparing at the Armory in Southeast Washington, D.C, for a 3:00 p.m. shift takeover. The Armory also housed a command-and-control squad that handled logistics at about 52 members strong, in addition to a Civil Support Team of about 20 members. That gave Colonel Hunter a maximum limit of 348 activated servicemembers, eight more than the allotted 340—nearly all of whom reported directly to him on January 6th.

The QRF was most prepared for responding to sudden and escalating civil unrest. At Joint Base Andrews, they were provisioned with full riotcontrol kits, including a helmet with a face shield already attached, protective vest, shin guards, knee guards, shield, and baton. The head of the QRF—himself provided little guidance on the contours of his mission—had his squad train for civil disturbance on January 5th and the morning of the 6th as they waited. Not only had they trained, but they trained together, as a unit—a benefit military officials all agreed is ideal. Army leadership, all the way up to Secretary McCarthy, had no idea that Lt. Col. Reinke had taken these initiatives. Secretary McCarthy agreed that had he known of their civil disturbance preparation, "it could have" affected the speed with which approval was ultimately given for their deployment.