Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/752

 "[W]hen we get a request next time, we have to be absolutely certain that we understand the mission clearly," and that "no other civil authority could re-mission off that support without the approval of either the Secretary of the Army or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense."

In mid-June 2020, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Secretary McCarthy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, and Major General Walker huddled to talk about what went wrong in the preceding weeks. Senior defense officials then decided they would take a "more active" role in directing the force. "[A]s a result, we all took a more active interest in what was happening down to the tactical level to make sure that we were, again, abiding by kind of the core principles of civil-military relations," former Secretary Esper said.

Major General Walker said he was not told about that shift in perspective: "[I]f the Army thought different of how we respond to civil unrest, civil disturbance, I would hope . . . they would communicate that with the guy—with the person who is going to execute that change."

In the words of General Milley, the summer of 2020 had been "a pretty gut-wrenching experience." The Department of Defense was still recovering when it was faced with the decision of the manner and degree to which the DC Guard should provide assistance to law enforcement authorities planning, just seven months later, for the events anticipated in connection with Congressional certification of the electoral votes on January 6, 2021.

A "Tailored" Request for Guard Resources. On December 19, 2020, President Trump tweeted, "Big protest in DC on January 6th. Be there! Will be wild!" From that day forward, a rookie DC intelligence analyst saw a tenfold uptick in violent rhetoric targeting Congress and law enforcement. Right-wing groups were sharing histories of violence and some not traditionally aligned had begun coordinating their efforts. The analyst's report reached more senior DC leadership, including, eleven days later, Mayor Bowser. In the course of the Committee's investigation, it received and reviewed a significant number of documents indicating that certain intelligence and law enforcement agencies understood that violence was possible or even likely on January 6th. The Committee received many of those materials from the U.S. Secret Service, but also from other agencies as well.

On Thursday, December 31, 2020, the day after the briefing, Mayor Bowser sent a letter to Major General Walker requesting Guard assistance for January 5 and 6, 2021. A second letter specified the District's request as limited to two forms of assistance: crowd management at Metro stations and blocking vehicles at traffic posts. It did not request help with potential civil disturbance.