Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/751

 Walker said. Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy "really wanted us out there." Secretary McCarthy, with all his authorities, was physically beside Major General Walker throughout that summer. "[H]e was with me for all of it," Major General Walker said. "He came to the [A]rmory every day. He brought his staff with him." As has been widely reported, a number of President Trump's senior advisors, including Attorney General Bill Barr, resisted President Trump's requests to deploy the Guard or other troops in various states and cities where violence had occurred or was underway.

In the summer of 2020, nothing was being written down; it "was just all verbal back and forth." That approach sped up response times. But as the DC Guard footprint grew and controversies began plaguing the operation, Secretary McCarthy came away with the lesson that deliberative and by written order beat fast and by oral command.

"What we learned in the process was we were not capturing a lot of the information in writing in the orders process, which is fundamental, foundational because of the stress of the situation and the speed of the situation," Secretary McCarthy said.

While a concept of operations ("con-op") was developed at the lower level during the summer 2020 operations, it did not require approval or input at the secretary level. That approach came to be seen as a mistake that should not be replicated the next time there was a civil disturbance crisis in the nation's capital. General Walter Piatt, director of the Army staff, explained: "That's where Secretary McCarthy put that restriction to say, I want a concept of the operation before we just send a force to do something."

One of the most visible and highly criticized of the summer 2020 operations was the use of low-flying helicopters that appeared to be bearing down on protesters with the aim of dispersing them. On June 1st, as Guard presence tripled overnight, the use of helicopters meant for aerial surveillance "somehow got translated to a very competent Army officer that 'I am to fly low and loud to deter looters,' " General Piatt said. "[W]hat the investigation revealed was that we did not have good procedures in place to provide military support to a very serious civil disturbance ongoing. The— because—the pilot of that aircraft believed that was his mission."

The "embarrass[ment]" of the low-flying helicopter affected Secretary McCarthy. General Charles Flynn, then-deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and training, told the Select Committee, "I know the Secretary was concerned." He further explained: "I'm sure that affected his thinking."

Secretary McCarthy became convinced that a concept of operations needed to be "explicit, tailored" and—most importantly—that it needed to "come from [the] top down." Secretary McCarthy told his staff,