Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/728

 requests for permits could be declined, canceled, or permits revoked.87 Participants from the Department of the Interior responded that "that wasn't an option."

According to Director Tomney, DHS felt confident in the United States Secret Service's ability to protect the White House and Vice President, the Federal Protective Service's (FPS) ability to protect potentially affected Federal buildings, as well as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection's ability to augment FPS, if needed. General Milley and the other DoD participants left the call reassured that the law enforcement agencies involved were prepared for January 6th.

During the January 3rd call, the DoD also raised the issue of a lead Federal agency. General Milley noted the desirability of a law enforcement lead for coordinating the interagency planning and response effort, given the "potpourri of jurisdictions" and diversity of agency authorities. Secretary Miller testified that he believed he and Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen were in agreement that the DOJ should lead interagency coordination for January 6th, although when asked during the call, Rosen did not confirm that the DOJ would play that role. The question of a lead Federal agency remained "an open, unanswered question" at the end of the January 3rd call. The same day, Rosen was attempting to secure a White House meeting with President Trump regarding the imminent appointment of Clark in his stead.

On a January 4th inter-agency call with the same group, Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue made the DOJ's role clear: it would take the lead in certain areas of responsibility, although he stressed that the DOJ was never designated lead Federal agency and could not serve in that capacity. On the evening of January 4th, the FBI established a Strategic Information Operations Center ("SIOC") at FBI headquarters, which became operational on January 5th. Unlike the previous summer's civil protests, DoD did not have a representative at the SIOC. All the DoD officials who were interviewed by the Select Committee, however, believe that the DOJ agreed to take—and may have been assigned by the White House—the lead coordinating role. Director Tomney, however, remembered that the DOJ participants neither agreed to, nor explicitly declined, the lead agency role.

During the January 3rd and 4th calls, General Milley, according to Donoghue, noted that "[t]here should be plenty of police forces available without using Federal military troops," so he was adamant that no active-duty troops would be deployed on January 6th. During this call, participants also discussed whether there was a need for a police-based quick reaction force and concluded that the size of the MPD and USCP police forces made that unnecessary.