Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/726

 Chief Contee also staged police at the White House and Lafayette Park. Chief Contee said that although the MPD "are normally not fully deployed for civil disturbance for counting votes at the U.S. Capitol," "obviously, as we got closer from the time of the initial [December 19th Trump] tweet leading up, with all of the rhetoric that's out there on social media, you know, people were going to bring guns, were going to do this and that and so forth, that caused us obviously to change the way that we were going to deploy for January the 6th." Because of the numerous social media posts about guns, MPD also posted signs on the National Mall indicating that possession of firearms in Washington, D.C., was illegal and would be prosecuted.

On January 3rd, the same day Capitol Police's Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) issued a threat assessment indicating that "Congress itself is a target," Chief Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul D. Irving to discuss requesting the DC National Guard to assist in policing the Capitol's perimeter. Chief Sund needed approval from the Capitol Police Board, which consisted of Irving, Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael C. Stenger, and the Architect of the Capitol J. Brett Blanton. Chief Sund remembers that Irving responded immediately that he did not "like the optics" and that the intelligence did not support the request. Irving, however, remembers Chief Sund calling him to say the DC National Guard had offered 125 unarmed National Guardsmen to the USCP and MPD. He also remembered that, during a conference call, Chief Sund told Stenger and him that the National Guard would be utilized in similar fashion to the assistance provided to the DC police, namely, staffing intersections, and for traffic control to free up officers, but then could be used for crowd control, although he acknowledged that the Capitol campus does not have many intersections in need of staffing.

The Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed that a request for the DC National Guard would not be necessary, particularly if the USCP was in an "all hands on deck" posture. Chief Sund agreed with Stenger and Irving that the intelligence did not support a request for DC National Guard assistance. According to Irving, Chief Sund did not believe the National Guard would add much to the USCP security plan for January 6th. Chief Sund briefed the Capitol Police Board on the USCP's enhanced security plan, and "all hands on deck posture"—including 1,200-plus officers, added Civil Disturbance Units (CDU), an enhanced Containment Emergency Response Team ("CERT"), and an expanded perimeter. Chief Sund did not believe, based on the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary to cancel officers' days off.

USCP leadership did not create a department-wide plan for the January 6th event. In retrospect Chief Sund believed "there should have been a