Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/381

 Meanwhile, the documents from Michigan and Wisconsin did not even arrive to Congress on time, so they also had missed the required statutory deadline.

Several of the Trump team's fake electoral slates also failed to follow State rules specifying where they were required to meet. In Georgia and Wisconsin, State lawmakers or their staff appear to have helped participants gather inside their State capitols. But in Michigan, the fake Trump electors were blocked from entering the State capitol building. Despite this, they still signed documents attesting that they "convened and organized in the State Capitol, in the City of Lansing, Michigan, and at 2:00 p.m. . . . performed the duties enjoined upon us." That document had been signed earlier in the day off-site, and one of the signatories even told the Committee she didn't join their march to the State capitol building because she "didn't see a need to go."

If the entire premise of the fake votes was not enough, these infirmities also meant that they had no legal relevance. In no way could they ever have been used by the Vice President to disregard the real votes of electors chosen by the voters.

In the weeks between December 14th and January 6th, President Trump's team continued to embrace the idea that the fake electoral votes had a purpose. Although Giuliani and White House speechwriter Stephen Miller made public comments on December 14th suggesting that the uncertified Trump votes were merely contingent, that pretense was dropped in short order.

For example, on December 17th, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Fox News that in numerous States "there has been an alternate slate of electors voted upon that Congress will decide in January." On December 21st, President Trump and Vice President Pence each joined parts of a White House meeting in which Members of Congress from the Freedom Caucus encouraged the Vice President to reject Biden electors from one or more of the seven contested States. And days later, Eastman cited the existence of the fake votes in an email to Boris Epshteyn, a member of the Giuliani legal team, writing, "[t]he fact that we have multiple slates of electors demonstrate[s] the uncertainty of either. That should be enough."

As discussed further in Chapter 5, that email contained Eastman's 2-page memo proposing a strategy for January 6th based on the incorrect legal theory that Vice President Pence could assert some authority as President of the Senate to prevent or delay the election of former Vice President Biden during the joint session. Eastman's memo relied on the fake votes, which the memo featured in the very first line: "7 states have transmitted