Page:Fifth Report - Matter referred on 21 April 2022 (conduct of Rt Hon Boris Johnson).pdf/61

 conclusion that it is “unlikely on the balance of probabilities that Mr Johnson, in the light of his cumulative direct personal experience of these events, could have genuinely believed that the Rules or Guidance were being complied with”.

201.''' We have also set out, in paragraphs 188 to 189 above, a list of ways in which we consider Mr Johnson has misled the House or been disingenuous in his responses to our inquiry. His personal knowledge of breaches of the rules and guidance, combined with his repeated failures pro-actively to investigate and seek authoritative assurances as to compliance issues, amount to a deliberate closing of his mind or at least reckless behaviour. We find it highly unlikely that Mr Johnson having given any reflection to these matters could himself have believed the assertions he made to the House at the time when he was making them, still less that he could continue to believe them to this day. Someone who is repeatedly reckless and continues to deny that which is patent is a person whose conduct is sufficient to demonstrate intent. Many aspects of Mr Johnson’s defence are not credible: taken together, they form sufficient basis for a conclusion that he intended to mislead.'''

202. We conclude that in deliberately misleading the House Mr Johnson committed a serious contempt.

Recommended sanction
203. It is ultimately for the House, not the Committee of Privileges, to determine whether a contempt has been committed, and if so what sanction, if any, to impose. To assist the House in this duty, if the House concurs that Mr Johnson committed a serious contempt, we have considered what sanction would be appropriate.

204. In serious cases the House has the right to suspend a Member, or withhold their salary, or expel them. These sanctions require the explicit approval of the House on the basis of a motion. The House is thus the decision-maker in terms of punishment of a Member for contempt, just as only the House itself can finally determine whether a contempt has actually been committed. The role of the Committee is therefore to carry out a delegated power of investigation and to report its findings to the House, with recommendations for action where appropriate. Motions to implement sanctions recommended by the Committee (unlike those recommended by the Committee on Standards or the Independent Expert Panel) are amendable and debatable.

205. The standing orders of the House do not set out a list of sanctions which the Committee may recommend. In deciding on its recommendations the Committee will be guided by precedent wherever possible and appropriate. There are few relevant precedents. Erskine May makes clear that the House may punish acts or omissions for which there is no precedent as long as they fall within the definition of contempt.

206. In addition to sanctions imposed in cases of contempt following Privileges Committee investigations, sanctions may also be imposed in cases considered by the Standards Committee where Members are found to have breached the Code of Conduct. In recent years the Standards Committee has taken steps to codify the use of sanctions in such cases. Breaches of the Code by Members may be regarded as being contempts, although they are dealt with under separate procedures set up by the House. As the intertwined history of