Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/83

28 31. There is one difficulty which this definition leaves unresolved, and that is the question, Whether the truth of which philosophy is the pursuit be a kind of truth or an element of truth; in other words, whether absolute truth can be apprehended by itself, or whether it must always be apprehended in union with relative truth? In short, whether each, the absolute and the relative, is a form of truth which can be apprehended without the other, or whether each can be apprehended only in combination with the other? This question I have considered under Proposition VI of my 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' where I have stated my own opinion, that the two must always be apprehended together. But as this is a point which can be settled only as the result of our researches, and as the whole history of philosophy shows that it is a very undecided question, I think it better to make no allusion to it in the definition, but merely to affirm that absolute truth is the object of philosophy, without saying whether absolute truth is a kind or is an element of truth. And, in the same way, I do not at present discuss or decide the question, whether reason be itself a faculty or merely an element of a faculty, sense being the other element which goes to make up the completed faculty.

32. Philosophy having been thus defined, we are now in a position to define the history of philosophy. This definition is very easily given—it follows as a matter of course. If philosophy be the pursuit which