Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/79

24 person who apprehends it, no change in the constitution of nature, can in any degree affect it. This truth, then, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, is universal and absolute. Thus we have two sorts of truths; a particular order, comprising all the truths represented by our first and second truths, and a universal order, comprising truths represented by our third truth. The particular order may be described as consisting of truths for some, but not for other, not for all, intelligences. The universal order may be described as consisting of truth for all intelligences.

26. What I have now particularly to call your attention to is, that just as there is one order or form of truth which is particular, and another order which is universal, so there is a faculty in man which is particular, and a faculty which is universal. The difference in the truths justifies us in maintaining a difference in the faculties or organs by which they are apprehended. We do not begin by finding that the mind has different faculties, but we begin by finding that the truths which the mind apprehends are very different in their character; that some of them are particular and relative, are truths merely for us; while others of them are universal and absolute, are truths for all intelligence; and in virtue of the objective distinction, as we may call it, we postulate a subjective distinction in the mind which apprehends them. We declare that, in reference to the particular