Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/78

Rh side; and therefore I maintain that this is a truth valid not only for any intelligence, but valid for all intelligence; and that all mathematical truth, from the simplest axiom up to the most recondite conclusions, is of this character.

25. These observations (which have been somewhat hastily thrown together) are designed to contribute towards establishing this great and important conclusion, that the mind of man consists of a universal part as well as of a particular part, or of what we may call a universal faculty and a particular faculty. To pave the way for a right understanding of this distinction, I adduced these illustrative truths. The first was the truth that sugar is sweet; the second was that the earth goes round the sun; the third was (to take the simplest of the two cases) that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Now, I have shown you that the first and second of these truths cannot be said to be true for all intelligences; and I have assigned the reason of this, which is, that either the constitution of the person who apprehends them, or the constitution of nature, can be conceived to be changed in so far as regards these truths, and that with the change, either in the constitution of the person or in the constitution of nature, the truth would cease to be true. Therefore they are particular and relative. I have further shown you that the third of these truths can be declared true for all intelligence, because no change in the constitution of the