Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/72

Rh them so much apparent weight, that the dominant philosophy of this country is founded upon a denial and repudiation of the definition which I have ventured to lay down as the only true definition of philosophy. In direct contravention of this, high authorities have maintained that philosophy is the pursuit of mere relative truth, of truth as it exists, not for all, but only for our intelligence. And they found this definition on the consideration that man can deal with truth only as it presents itself to his particular mental constitution. Their own doctrine and their objection to our position may be summed up under the following query, which they address to us: How is it possible for man to know or to speak of any truth, except such as exists for his particular intelligence? How can he have anything to do with truth? What can he know about truth as it exists for all intelligence?

20. I answer, that man can have nothing to do with truth as it exists for all intelligence, can know nothing at all about it, unless there be something in his intelligence which links him to all intelligence; some point or quality in which his intelligence agrees with all other intelligences; in short, unless there be a universal or common nature in all intelligences. If there be this, if intelligence be to some extent universally the same, then it is obvious that man can know the truth as it exists for all intelligences; for he has merely to look to the truth which addresses