Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/68

Rh minds, namely, that they agree in some respect, seems to be a necessary axiom of reason. In all intelligence there is, by the terms of its conception, a universal, that is, an essential unity of kind, however small the point of unity may be.

14. On religious grounds this unity might be much more largely insisted on. Its postulation is the very foundation and essence of religion. This unity constitutes the very bond, and the only bond, between the Creator and the creature. Deny this connection between the divine and the human reason, and you destroy the very possibility of religion.

15. I admit, however, that the answer which I have ventured to return to this question, is one which cannot be expected to command your assent until you have time to reflect upon it more fully, and it is well worthy of your most attentive consideration. It is indeed the question of the present day, as it was the great question of philosophy in the time of Socrates and the Sophists. The whole sophistical philosophy proceeded on the assumption that there was or might be, an absolute diversity of kind in the constitution of intellectual natures; that different orders of minds had not necessarily anything whatsoever in common. From whence it followed that there were as many kinds of truth as there were kinds of mind, quot mentes, tot veritates; in other words, that there was no truth at all, no absolute