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10 been frequently mistaken. Hence many perplexities have arisen, and hence speculative thought has been often unjustly charged with inculcating absurdities, which existed nowhere except in the misapprehensions of its accusers.

11. Having thus explained and defined (intelligibly, I trust, though not fully, and perhaps not convincingly) the distinction between relative truth and absolute truth, we have now to ask, Which of these two forms of truth is the special object of philosophy? The answer is, that the attainment of absolute truth, of truth as it exists for all intellect, is the principal, though not the exclusive, aim of philosophy. Philosophy must not overlook altogether the consideration of relative truth, because perhaps a finer analysis will show us that the two are ever blended together in an essential and inseparable contrast. But nevertheless, as I have said, absolute truth is the principal, indeed the proper, object at which philosophy aims; it is the point at which all the higher metaphysicians of every age and of every nation have aimed, and at which it is their duty to aim (however far short of the mark their efforts may be doomed to fall), if they would continue true to their vocation.

12. A question here arises which threatens to cut short our progress: Are man's faculties competent in any degree to the attainment of absolute truth?