Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/64

Rh 10. Secondly, of truth as absolute. As relative truth is truth which is true for one mind, or for one order of intelligence, so absolute truth is truth which is true for all minds, for all orders of intelligence. It is plain that absolute truth cannot mean truth placed altogether out of relation to intelligence, for that would be equivalent to saying that the highest truth could not be apprehended by the most perfect intelligence, not even by omniscience. To define absolute truth as that which stands out of relation to all reason—as that which is not to be known on any terms by any intelligence—is a position too absurd to require any exposure. All truth, therefore, is in this sense relative, that is, can be conceived only in relation to intelligence; but the distinction between absolute truth and relative truth is, as has been stated, this: that relative truth is what exists only for some, but not necessarily for all minds; while absolute truth is that which exists necessarily for all minds. We shall find hereafter that this distinction is of great service to us in leading us to understand the grounds upon which philosophers generally have set so little store on the truth of our mere sensible impressions. No philosopher ever denied that the intimations of the senses are relatively true, or that we should place implicit confidence in them as presentations relatively true. But many have denied that these intimations were absolutely true, were valid of necessity for all minds. The grounds, however, on which those philosophers proceeded, have