Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/62

Rh I cannot tell you this in one word or in one sentence. We must make our approaches to it gradually, beginning with what is very indefinite, and making it more definite as we proceed. Let us begin, then, with a definition, which, though it conveys very little in-formation, is quite unexceptionable—is, indeed, what the whole world is willing to assent to—and let us say that philosophy is the pursuit of truth. This is the first, and simplest, and vaguest conception and definition of philosophy which we can form.

8. This definition calls for some explanation as to what we mean by truth. When we say that philosophy is the pursuit of truth, we must at any rate have some notion of the object of which philosophy is the pursuit. What, then, do we mean by truth? I commence by calling your attention to a distinction by means of which we may clear up our idea of truth, and bring ourselves to understand what it means; I refer to the distinction of truth into truth relative and truth absolute. When I have explained what these two kinds of truth are, we shall then be able to render our definition of philosophy more distinct and complete by declaring whether philosophy be the pursuit of truth relative or of truth absolute. I proceed, then, to speak first of relative truth, and secondly of absolute truth.

9. First, of truth as relative. A relative truth is a truth which is true for one mind, or for one order