Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/520

Rh certainly see a smooth and shining surface, but is this leaf in itself a smooth and shining surface? Most probably it is not, indeed we may say with certainty it is not; because, alter the structure of my eyes, or place the leaf under a powerful magnifier, and it will become rough and dull. Is it then rough and dull in itself? Not one whit more than it was smooth and shining. Its dullness and roughness are just as phenomenal as its shining and smoothness, because to a differently constituted eye it would present an appearance quite different from either of the other two. And this new appearance would, of course, not bring us one whit nearer to what the leaf was in itself. All that sentient beings can be certain of, is the appearance which the leaf presents to them: in short, all that we can be certain of is, what it is in relation to us, not what it is in itself; that is to say, not what it is verily and in truth.

11. The Sceptics may be supposed to put their case in this way: Nothing is hot in itself, because, what one being regards as hot, another being regards, or may regard, as cold. Nothing is cold in itself, because, what one being regards as cold, another regards, or may regard, as hot. Nothing is green or blue in itself, because, to a retina of a different degree of susceptibility, the green would not be green, but some other colour; and the blue would not be blue, but some other colour. Again, nothing is large in itself, because, what a small being thinks large, a