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452 to the practical rule of life; and this difference turns, as before, on the same principle as that on which their difference of opinion as to man's happiness, and as to man's nature, hinges. In their estimate of virtue, and in laying down the practical rule of life, the one party regards as essential what the other regards as accidental and conversely. According to the Epicureans, virtue consists in an indulgence of the passions in so far as prudence permits; and their rule of life would be, Indulge the passions, but from motives of prudence indulge them only in moderation. Here a yielding to the passions is inculcated as the essential and primary circumstance in the practice of virtue. The limit, the resistance, to the passion is set forth as the accidental and secondary circumstance. According to the Stoics, on the other hand, virtue consists in a limitation or subjugation of the passions, in so far as our nature allows; and their rule of life would be, Restrain or moderate the passions, but on prudential grounds (the wiser among them may he supposed to say)—on prudential grounds, do not carry this restraint too far. Do not carry it so far as to extinguish or eradicate the passions altogether. Here the subjugation of the passion is set forth as the primary and essential circumstance in the practice of virtue, while the indulgence of the passion is set forth as the secondary and non-essential circumstance. The Epicurean, regarding the passion and not the restraint as the essential in the practice of virtue, lays the emphasis on the indulgence, and may