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434 the term apathy we have their authority for saying, as given to us by Diogenes Laertius. He says, "According to the Stoics, the wise man is apathetic; that is, is free from perturbation, by being superior to error or false judgment; not, as many people (absurdly) interpret their statement, by being superior to all sense, emotion, feeling, or affection. The Stoics, indeed, have specially guarded themselves against this misinterpretation of their doctrine.” "There is also," says Epictetus, one of the most distinguished writers, "there is also another sort of apathetic man who is bad, who is the same in character as the hard and inflexible." This, however, is not the apathetic man of the Stoics. Epictetus goes on to say, "I am not to be apathetic like a stone or a statue; but I am withal to observe relations, both the natural and adventitious, as the man of religion, as the son, as the brother, as the father, and as the citizen."—(Arr. Epict., 1. 3, c. 2, p. 359.)

16. In considering, then, this third paradox of the Stoics, which represents a passionless or apathetic condition as the highest virtue of the soul, we must remember that their apathy did not consist in insensibility, or in a deadness of feeling; it did not consist in an extinction or eradication of the passions; On the contrary, in the character of their virtuous man they included rational desire and aversion; they included love and parental affection, friendship, and a general charity and benevolence to all mankind; they