Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/453

398 natural power is not itself that capacity; or at any rate it is not this until it has been so reacted upon by the practice of virtue as to have become a confirmed habit, or , of the mind. The main points then, comprehended under Aristotle's assertion that virtue is a habit may be summed up as follows:—

38. There is, first, an unconfirmed or indefinite power of acting either rightly or wrongly. This may be called a  in the sense already explained; but  more properly applies to powers which are limited by nature to one issue, which the power in question is not: it is open indifferently either to virtue or vice. Then, secondly, there is , a power of choice, involving freedom, reflection, deliberation, and will. This power may for a time be guided by instructors. But its proper function is that of self-determination: a man is self-determined to be either virtuous or vicious. Then, thirdly, there is . This is the act, or rather the continually-repeated act, the practice or custom through which, fourthly, the  or habit of virtue (or vice) is formed. This practice is the most important element in the process: through it the , or habit, or disposition, is built up. It is the sap which feeds and supports the life of our moral nature. ̒ includes an insight or recognition of the worth and excellence of this habit, and of the actions by which it has been formed. There is, fifthly, the conduct which flows out of this , conduct to which alone the