Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/450

Rh actual seeing, actual hearing, and so forth, the ; has passed into . Now, observe that in such cases the  does not react upon the . Actual seeing () does not create the capacity of seeing. The capacity exists first: the practical operation is its consequence. This is to be particularly borne in mind in considering these natural  or capacities, and the practical operations that arise out of them: this, I say, is to be borne in mind, that the capacities come first and the operations second, and that the latter do not react, or react but very slightly, on the former. As I have said, it is not by using his eyes that a man acquires the power of seeing, it is not by actually feeling pleasure that a man acquires the power of feeling pleasure; he already has from nature the power of seeing and the power of feeling pleasure, and when these powers pass into act (), he sees and he feels pleasure. These are cases in which  comes first and  follows.

35. Now, it has here to be asked, does this analogy hold good in regard to man's capacity of virtue and his practice of virtue? Has man first a power or capacity of virtue, and then a practice conformable thereto, just as he has a power of seeing and of performing other operations, and a practice arising out of these powers? Aristotle answers, No; the analogy does not hold good; the cases are entirely different. Instead of the practice of virtue ()