Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/442

Rh it is proper that the acts should be of a right quality, in order that the habits which they generate may be of a right quality too. And it makes no small, but a great, yea, the greatest of differences, whether we are accustomed to act in this or in that particular way, even from our earliest childhood."

26. I go on to offer a few words of comment on the quotation from Aristotle's Ethics brought before you in the preceding section. His doctrine in regard to our having no natural capacity, , or virtue may require some slight explanation, in order to prevent it from being misconceived. There are, according to Aristotle, two kinds of , a  properly so called, and a  less properly so called. The  properly so called is a natural power, always followed by a constant and uniform species of ; the  less properly so called, may issue in two opposite species of . The former may be called a  restricted to one issue; the latter may be called a  capable of two opposite issues; it is in fact called so by Aristotle, . To illustrate these two, taking Aristotle's as well as other examples, a stone has a  of falling downwards to the earth; it is limited to that one issue; it has no  of falling upwards. When the  passes into act or , the stone takes a downward course,  proper. A grain of wheat has a  of passing into the green blade and then into the full ear. It has no