Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/393

338 nstance is. A thing cannot be an instance without being an instance of something; in so far as it is an instance, it is particular. The something of which it is an instance is a universal, an idea. Plato calls it also .

25. I must put you on your guard against supposing that it is possible for you to form any sort of representation of the idea or universal, or paradeigma. This cannot be done. The idea or universal cannot by any possibility be pictured in the imagination, for this would at once reduce it to the particular; this would destroy it as an idea, and convert it into an instance, which instance being of course an instance of something, would again require to be supplemented in thought by that of which it was an instance, namely, by an idea or universal. Much confusion is caused when we attempt to construe the idea to our mind as any sort of imaginary object. We must be satisfied, therefore, with thinking the idea or universal as a fact of intellect which is necessary as a foil or offset or complement to the other element of our cognition, the particular instance, namely; but which cannot be apprehended either by the senses or by the imagination, which derives all its data from the senses, and copies their impressions. This inability to form any sort of picture or representation of an idea does not proceed from any imperfection or limitation of our faculties, but is a quality inherent in the very nature of intelligence.